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Anil Alpman1
Revised version: August 08, 2013; First version: May, 2013
Abstract
This paper proposes a new theory of social norms that explores the relation between individuals’ income,
time allocation decisions, and consumption choices on the one hand, and the determinants of individuals’
decision to conform or not to social norms on the other. It is shown that rational consumers may obey
inefficient social norms, which in turn would slow economic development. An empirical test of the model is
performed for different categories of countries using the World Values Survey, a voluminous cross-country
micro dataset. The results yield the gain and the cost of disobeying inefficient social norms, the latter of
which can be used as an indicator of social pressure regarding conformity.
Keywords: Social Norms, Social Interactions, Consumer Behavior, Household Production, Economic
Development, Social Pressure Indicator
JEL Classification: D11, D12, O43, Z13.
1. Introduction
As an informal institution, social norms determine “the rules of the game” as much, if not more, as formal
institutions (North, 1990, 2005, p. 48-52), especially in developing countries where formal institutions are
often inoperative. Socially accepted and expected behaviors are the rules defined by social norms which
can shape, together with formal institutions, various aspects of everyday life such as consumption decisions,
property-rights regimes, species of crops grown by farmers, and whether making profits is acceptable (Ray,
1998, p. 155).
Yet, social norms “can become retrogressive” (Arrow, 1971), they can be “inimical to development”
(Ray, 1998, p. 155), and many social norms “do not benefit anyone” (Elster, 1989). In addition, social
norms often “go against narrow self-interest” and many “are not socially beneficial” (Bicchieri, 2006, p. 2
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E-mail address: anil.alpman@univ-paris1.fr
I thank Franc¸ois Gardes, Elisabeth Cudeville, the participants at the Annual Congress of the “Socie´te´ Canadienne de
Sciences Economiques”, and the participants at the “Journe´es de Microe´conomie Applique´e” for their helpful comments.
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.38 (Version révisée)
and 7). This paper refers to such social norms as inefficient, in the sense that disobeying them could lead
to a higher income (see Akerlof, 1980).
The economic approach rationalizes the persistence of inefficient social norms by arguing that there is a
tradeoff between the material well-being of the consumer and its desire to avoid social disapproval (see for
example Burke and Young, 2011; and Akerlof, 1980). However, the challenging and debated points consist in
specifying how the mechanisms through which social norms operate affect the consumer’s utility, and what
are the gain and the cost of disobeying inefficient social norms that ultimately determine the consumer’s
disobedience level to social norms.2
Following the definition of social norms given by Bicchieri (2006) and Elster (1996), social norms, unlike
moral norms, have not to be internalized: moral norms are followed because disobeying them triggers the
emotion of guilt that leads to a negative sense of self regardless of whether the disobedience is observed
(Elster, 1996). Indeed, “moral norms demand . . . an unconditional commitment” (Bicchieri, 2006, p. 20).
“The operation of social norms”, on the other hand, “depends crucially on the agent being observed by
others” (Elster, 2009, p. 196). Dana et al. (2006), and Haley and Fessler (2005) provide some evidence that
the obedience of individuals to social norms is conditional on whether they are observed: when individuals are
unobserved, they tend to disobey the social norms that they would have obeyed otherwise. As Elster (2007)
says, “the shame that sustains social norms is triggered by the perceived contempt of others”. Therefore,
disobedience per se does not induce a poor sense of self.3
Nevertheless, “the action tendency of contempt is avoidance” (Elster, 2009, p. 199): if an individual
is observed disobeying social norms, the society would have a negative opinion about that individual who
would be excluded by the society as a response. To avoid exclusion, individuals can conform their behaviors
to the expectations of the society without changing, however, their internal values. For instance, if the social
norm of wearing black at funerals (Elster, 1996) were to change to, say, wear white, would I have a poor
sense of myself by complying to this new norm? Probably not. Most likely, people would even provide the
necessary effort to conform to the new norm in order to avoid negative judgements and, eventually, to avoid
social exclusion.
Ultimately, the origin of the disutility caused by disobedience to social norms is to be found in the
deterioration of social interactions (as opposed to social isolation) rather than in an “identity loss” (i.e., a
negative sense of self) as in Akerlof and Kranton (2000), or “a loss of reputation” as in Akerlof (1980). A
good reputation is a mean for fruitful social interactions and thus reputation in itself does not affect directly
utility: isolate a man, and his reputation would have no effect on his utility while the absence of social
2Because integrating social norms into economic models is challenging, models concerned with social norms “have little or
no predictive power” according to Postlewaite (2011).
3“What makes something a social or a moral norm is our attitude toward it” (Bicchieri, 2006). Therefore, if disobeying a
norm leads a person to have a poor sense of himself, it is because this person considers that specific norm as a moral norm
rather than a social norm.
2
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interactions would torment his soul. Unlike the reputation, social interactions are a direct source of utility.
Therefore, this paper considers social interactions as a commodity produced by the consumer that gener-
ates utility. It is assumed moreover that disobeying inefficient social norms affects negatively the production
of social interactions while it increases the consumer’s income. The theoretical model, which is developed
in Section 2, shows that, under these assumptions, there is a unique level of disobedience that maximizes
utility. This approach enables partial levels of disobedience and incremental evolution of social norms.
The model predicts that the optimal disobedience level depends on individual-specific parameters (the
market wage rate, the output elasticities of inputs, and the individual’s preferences) and on country-specific
parameters (the quality of the economic environment and the tolerance of the society). Within a population,
country-specific parameters induce similar disobedience levels while individual-specific parameters allow for
some variances. On the other hand, the values of the parameters determine whether inefficient social norms
are more likely to persist or to vanish: as long as the cost of disobedience is high compared to its gain, that
is, the incentives to disobey inefficient social norms are weak, the average disobedience level in a country
would be low and thus inefficient social norms would persist for longer periods, impeding thereby economic
development. Hence, social norms are an additional factor that can account for income differences across
countries. Moreover, the theoretical results indicate that the optimal level of disobedience affects the level
of income, the time allocation, and the consumption choices of the consumer.
The empirical framework is presented in Section 3. That section begins by describing the variables of
the World Values Survey which are used in the empirical test, followed by the empirical specification. This
paper’s approach enables the analysis of the incentives that determine an individual’s behavior regarding
social norms without necessarily defining any specific norms. The empirical test yields the estimates of the
gain and the cost of disobedience to inefficient social norms for rich, emerging, developing, and Arab Spring
countries. The estimates of the cost of disobedience provide a valuable indicator: the social pressure put on
an individual to not disobey the society’s social norms.
The results are presented in Section 4. The level of disobedience as well as the gain and the cost of
disobedience for each category of countries are compared and discussed in length in Section 5.
2. The Model
2.1. Assumptions
2.1.1. Utility and Household Production Functions
In addition to the arguments mentioned above, studies in psychology and in behavioral medicine provide
further evidence about the importance of social interactions for physical and mental health.4 Therefore, let
4See Cacioppo et al. (2010), Hawkley and Cacioppo (2010), and Hawkley et al. (2010).
3
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the utility be a function of the level of social interactions, denoted Zs, and of the consumption quantity of a
composite commodity, denoted Zc. Human nature is assumed to be such that, for a given level of utility, it
can exchange social interactions for non-social commodities only to some extend, implying that Zs and Zc
are imperfect substitutes. Moreover, it is assumed that each additional unit of Zs satisfies a lower psychical
and socioeconomical need. Hence, the utility could be represented by a Cobb-Douglas function:
U = Zθs Z
1−θ
c (1)
Zi, with i = {c, s}, is a final good produced by the consumer who combines market goods, Ci, with
his time, ti.
5 Assuming that inputs are imperfect substitutes with decreasing marginal productivity, the
production functions of Zc and Zs can take the Cobb-Douglas form:
6
Zc = C
β
c t
1−β
c (2)
and
Zs = µ(x, δ) C
α
s t
1−α
s (3)
where µ is the total factor productivity of Cs and ts as a function of the disobedience level to norms, x
(the higher is x, the greater is the disobedience level, with x ≥ 0), and the intolerance of the society to
disobedience, δ (the higher is δ, the more severely the society punishes disobedience, with δ > 0).
The properties of the total factor productivity are defined by the following assumptions: first, increasing
disobedience to norms deteriorates the reputation (Akerlof, 1980) that in turn decreases the production level
of social interactions for a given level of inputs. Thus, increasing disobedience to norms decreases µ: ∂µ/∂x <
0 and µ(0, δ) = q > 0 where q is the highest value of µ . Then, it is assumed that people ignore low levels
of disobedience and punish each additional level of disobedience more than proportionally. Indeed, ignoring
disobedience, avoiding, gossiping, and openly ostracizing are more than proportional punishments. As a
consequence, limx→0
(
∂µ/∂x
)
= 0 and µ decreases more than proportionally with increasing x: ∂2µ/∂x2 < 0.
Thirdly, an increase in the intolerance of the society decreases µ for each level of disobedience (except if the
individual does not disobey norms): ∂µ/∂δ < 0 and ∂2µ/(∂x∂δ) < 0. For δ = δ, let xexcl denote the level
of disobedience for which µ(xexcl, δ) = 0. It is assumed that ∀x > xexcl, µ(x, δ) = 0, which implies that the
5It is assumed that there is no joint production: an input used in the production of Zs cannot be simultaneously used in
the production of Zc.
6For example, for housecleaning, an individual can substitute time input by hiring someone through the market to do it for
him (note that the hiring process still requires, even though very little, some time). Similarly, an individual who spends little
time with his friends may maintain his level of social interactions by offering them many gifts.
4
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individual is socially excluded (i.e., Zs = 0).
7
2.1.2. The Income
Disobeying inefficient social norms may nevertheless be “of pecuniary advantage to the person who
disobeys” (Akerlof, 1980). Consider the following examples: obeying social gender norms may lower the
wage rate by inducing inefficient allocation of labor (see Udry, 1996; and Zwarteveen, 1996). Social norms
of working places, which forbid pulling strings or rate-busting, may also lower the wage rate for someone
who obeys them. Agricultural social norms may prescribe the cropping of a traditional plant even if farmers
are not competitive in its production (Ray, 1998, p. 155–156). The social norm of anti-achievement (Elster,
2009, p. 196) or the social norm proscribing profits (Ray, 1998, p. 155) “can discourage the gifted from
using his talents” (Elster, 1989), resulting potentially on a lower wage rate as well.
Therefore, let the wage rate of the consumer be given by the function w:
w(x,W,E, δ) = W + γ(x,E, δ) (5)
where W is the market wage rate prevailing in the profession of the consumer regardless of his behavior
vis-a`-vis social norms; γ is the monetary gain of disobedience as a function of x, E and δ; and E ≥ 0 is the
quality of the economic environment (e.g., the efficiency of formal institutions).
The relation between γ and x is the outcome of an efficiency effect and a punishment effect. The former
concerns the increase of the wage rate induced by the efficiency gain that arises from disobeying inefficient
social norms. The efficiency effect is assumed to define a decreasing and always positive relation between
the marginal gain of disobedience and the level of disobedience; more specifically, let the marginal gain of
disobedience tend to infinity around complete obedience and to zero around complete disobedience. The
intuition behind this assumption is that each additional level of disobedience reduces the scope of further
efficiency gain.
The punishment effect, on the other hand, affects negatively the gain of disobedience (γ) because of sanc-
tions imposed by the society against individuals who disobey social norms. Besides direct material sanctions,
emotional sanctions such as avoidance and gossip can also generate material loss for non-conformists by dete-
riorating their reputation and their desirability on the labor market. As it has been assumed in Section 2.1.1,
the society ignores low levels of disobedience, and each additional level of disobedience is punished more
than proportionally.
7An example of a functional form satisfying the expected properties of µ is (in equation [4], q = 1) µ(x, δ) = 1− δx2 if x ≤
(
1
δ
) 1
2
µ(x, δ) = 0 if x >
(
1
δ
) 1
2
(4)
5
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xw(x)
µ(x)
xexcl
xmax
W
Figure 1: The total factor productivity and the wage rate functions
Therefore, when both effects are combined, the marginal gain of disobedience is decreasing and it becomes
negative above a level of disobedience denoted xmax because the punishment effect outweighs the efficiency
effect. Utility maximizing behavior suggests however that the disobedience level will not be higher than
xmax, which restricts the possible range of disobedience to x ∈ [0, xmax].8 As a consequence, in-between
this range, ∂γ/∂x > 0; ∂2γ/∂x2 < 0; γ(0, E, δ) = 0 and limx→0
(
∂γ/∂x
)
= +∞ (see Figure 1).
Furthermore, the gain of disobedience (γ) depends on the economic (E) and the social (δ) environment
because these are assumed to determine the magnitude of the efficiency and punishment effects. For instance,
if the labor market is missing or private property is not properly enforced, that is, if E is low, disobeying
social norms mentioned above is likely to have only a minor impact on the wage rate: ∂γ/∂E > 0 and
∂2γ/(∂x∂E) > 0. On the other hand, if the society becomes less tolerant, it will punish each level of
disobedience more severely, reducing thereby the gain of disobedience: ∂γ/∂δ < 0 and ∂2γ/(∂x∂δ) < 0.9
Finally, a person would be excluded from the labor market when his behavior becomes socially unaccept-
able, which would also imply social exclusion. It is therefore assumed that w and µ tend to zero in similar
values of x as in Figure 1.
8If x > xmax, disobedience would decrease both, w and µ. Thus, a rational individual will never disobey social norms more
than xmax.
9A possible functional form of the gain of disobedience is
γ = Exτ − δx2 with 0 < τ < 1 (6)
6
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2.1.3. Summary
In this paper, the consumer produces a composite commodity (Zc) and social interactions (Zs) by
combining his time (ti) with market goods (Ci). Social interactions is a particular final good: as disobedience
to social norms increases, the total factor productivity (µ) associated with social interactions decreases more
than proportionally. On the other hand, disobeying social norms increases the wage rate (w) at a decreasing
rate. It follows that the disobedience level of a rational individual would never be higher than xmax as
mentioned above. Hence, in the remainder of this paper, x ∈ [0, xmax]. Note that if all social norms were
efficient, individuals would have no incentives to disobey them. This model is therefore concerned with
inefficient social norms. The choice variables are Zi, Ci, ti and x, and, until Section 2.3, W , E, and δ are
omitted in the functions notation for easier readability.
2.2. The Consumer’s Choices
The consumer’s income constraint is
pcCc + psCs = w(x)tw (7)
and his time constraint is given by
tw + tc + ts = T (8)
where tw is the time spent working on the market, pi is the price of Ci, and T is the total available time.
Combine equations (7) and (8) to obtain the full income constraint:
pcCc + w(x)tc + psCs + w(x)ts = w(x)T (9)
The optimal levels of ti, Ci and Zi are such that they maximize the consumer’s utility (1) subject to the
production constraints (2) and (3), and to the full income constraint (9). The first order condition giving
the optimal combination of the factors used in the production of Zi is (see Michael and Becker, 1973)
(
∂U
∂Zi
∂Zi
∂Ci
)/(
∂U
∂Zi
∂Zi
∂ti
)
=
∂Zi/∂Ci
∂Zi/∂ti
=
pi
w(x)
(10)
Combining the first order condition (10) with (2) and (3) yields the optimal level of inputs:
t∗s = ts(Zs, x) =
Zs
µ(x)
(
ps (1− α)
w(x)α
)α
(11)
C∗s = Cs(Zs, x) =
Zs
µ(x)
(
w(x)α
ps (1− α)
)1−α
(12)
7
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t∗c = tc(Zc, x) = Zc
(
pc (1− β)
w(x)β
)β
(13)
C∗c = Cc(Zc, x) = Zc
(
w(x)β
pc (1− β)
)1−β
(14)
The optimal consumption levels of Zc and Zs are obtained by equalizing the ratio of their marginal
utility to the ratio of their marginal cost:
∂U/∂Zs
∂U/∂Zc
=
w(x)(∂ts/∂Zs) + ps(∂Cs/∂Zs)
w(x)(∂tc/∂Zc) + pc(∂Cc/∂Zc)
=
[
pαs w(x)
1−α a
]
/µ(x)
pβc w(x)1−β b
≡ pis
pic
(15)
where b ≡ [β/(1− β)](1−β) + [(1− β)/β]β ; a ≡ [α/(1− α)](1−α) + [(1− α)/α]α; and pii is the shadow price
of Zi. The full income constraint can be written in terms of final goods:
Zcpic + Zspis = w(x)T (16)
Combine the first order condition (15) with equation (16) to obtain the optimal consumption level of Zs
and Zc:
Z∗s = Zs(x) =
θT
a
(
w(x)
ps
)α
µ(x) (17)
Z∗c = Zc(x) =
(1− θ)T
b
(
w(x)
pc
)β
(18)
Equations (11) to (14) suggest that the level of disobedience to inefficient norms affects the optimal
level and combination of inputs: for example, an increase in the level of disobedience, by increasing the
opportunity cost of time (w), leads time input to be substituted by market goods. Furthermore, Z∗c is
strictly increasing with the level of disobedience whereas the optimal level of social interactions initially
increases with x, and, as disobedience increases further, Z∗s starts to decrease because the income effect (i.e.,
an increase of Zs resulting from an increase of w) is outweighed by the reputation effect, that is, a decrease
of Zs resulting from a decrease of µ (see Appendix A).
2.3. Optimal Disobedience Level to Inefficient Social Norms
Let V denote the indirect utility as a function of x:
V (x) = T
(
θ
pαs a
)θ (
1− θ
pβc b
)1−θ
w(x)αθ+β(1−θ) µ(x)θ (19)
8
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The optimal disobedience level is the one that maximizes the indirect utility. This methodology is possible
because the choice of the disobedience level to norms is unconstrained, and it does not affect the definition
of the first order conditions (10) and (15). Therefore, maximize V with respect to x (see Appendix B for
the second order condition):
∂V (x)
∂x
= T
(
θ
a pαs
)θ (
1− θ
b pβc
)1−θ
w(x)αθ+β(1−θ) µ(x)θ
[
∂w(x)
∂x
[
αθ+β(1−θ)] w(x)−1+θ∂µ(x)
∂x
µ(x)−1
]
= 0
(20)
Using equation (5) and including W , E, and δ in the notation of functions, equation (20) holds if
− ∂γ(x,E, δ)/∂x
∂µ(x, δ)/∂x
=
W + γ(x,E, δ)
µ(x, δ)
[
α+ β(1− θ)/θ] (21)
Given the properties of γ and µ, there is a unique value of x (as a function of the exogenous variables),
denoted x∗, that verifies equation (21) (see Appendix C):
x∗ = x(θ, α, β, δ, E,W ) (22)
x∗ is the optimal disobedience level to social norms or, said differently, the optimal social behavior. The
optimal social behavior, which shapes economic decisions, is itself determined by economic and social factors.
The relation of x∗ with respect to θ, α, β, δ, E, and W discussed here below is found by comparative statics
analysis (see Appendix D for mathematical details).
An increase in individuals’ preferences for social interactions will lead them to obey more inefficient
social norms: ∂x∗/∂θ < 0. It is also straightforward to understand why the optimal disobedience level will
decrease as the society gets more intolerant to disobedience: ∂x∗/∂δ < 0.
The relation between the economic environment and the optimal social behavior is also quite intuitive:
as the economic environment improves, the gain of disobeying inefficient norms increases. As mentioned in
Section 2.1.2, better institutions—or technological innovations—create an environment where the increase
of the wage rate induced by disobedience is likely to be higher than in an environment with inoperative
institutions: ∂x∗/∂E > 0. This relation is consistent with the economic literature: better institutions and
greater tolerance are expected to have a positive impact for economic development.
As the output elasticities of market goods (i.e., α and β) increases, the shadow prices of Zs and Zc
become less sensitive to an increase of the wage rate (see equation [15]). As a consequence, the optimal level
of disobedience increases: ∂x∗/∂β > 0 and ∂x∗/∂α > 0.
Lastly, equation (19) suggests that the marginal indirect utility of the wage rate is decreasing because
αθ+β(1−θ) < 1. Therefore, as the market wage rate increases, the marginal utility of the wage rate that was
9
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induced by disobedience becomes lower than the marginal disutility of disobedience (see equation [21]).10
In other words, when the market wage rate increases, obeying more to norms generates greater utility by
increasing Zs (through an increase in µ) than it generates disutility by decreasing both commodities (through
a decrease in γ): ∂x∗/∂W < 0.
Substitute x with x∗ in equations (5), (11) to (14), (17), and (18) to find the effective wage rate, the
effective level of inputs, the effective level of social interactions, and the effective consumption quantity of
the composite commodity. Unless the gain of disobedience is much higher than its cost, or that there is a
significant exogenous shock on parameters affecting the optimal disobedience level, individuals will rather
obey inefficient social norms, and, as a consequence, inefficient social norms will last for a longer period of
time, impeding thereby economic development.11 This is especially true when the society is more intolerant
to disobedience (high δ); the output elasticities of time inputs are important (low α and β); the preference
for social interactions is high (high θ); the quality of the economic environment is low (low E); and the
market wage rate is high (high W ).
The model accounts for the four characteristic features of social norms pointed out by Burke and Young
(2011): first, the existence of one commodity that is positively associated with obedience to inefficient social
norms is enough to induce choices that individuals would not have made if they had not to conform. This
is the conformity warp effect. The traditional household production model—and the mainstream consumer
theory generally speaking—is a special case where social issues arising from non-conformity are supposed to
not affect individuals. Then, when the society attaches a high importance to a social norm, its disobedience
would be severely punished, that is, δ would be high, and people would not disobey this particular norm.
This captures the long-run stability effect. Thirdly, the social behaviors will converge within a population
but not necessarily between populations since the differences in the exogenous variables will lead societies
to diverge. This corresponds to the local conformity/global diversity effect. Finally, the existence of a
subsistence level of income under which the utility is zero would yield the punctuated equilibrium effect.
This effect suggests that the accumulation of small changes may eventually reach a tipping point where a
social norm would suddenly shift. The model predicts that the consumer adjusts its disobedience level at
the margin when the market wage rate (W ) decreases marginally. In this context, social norms evolve at a
constant pace. However, the tipping point would be reached when the marginal decrease in the market wage
rate would induce an income below the subsistence level. In this case, the consumer’s disobedience level
would have to shift (rather than increasing marginally) to restore the subsistence level of income (provided
that the consumer can achieve this income level before the marginal gain of disobedience becomes negative).
10The value of x that verifies equation (21) implies necessarily that the marginal indirect utility of disobedience induced
by the increase of w is equal to its marginal disutility induced by the decrease of µ so that the marginal indirect utility of
disobedience is zero (∂V/∂x = 0).
11Since there is a wide range of social behavior between complete obedience to inefficient social norms (i.e. x = 0) and
complete disobedience to them (i.e., the disobedience level associated with the most efficient social behavior), it is considered
that an individual “rather obeys social norms” if his behavior is closer to complete obedience.
10
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3. Empirical Framework
3.1. The Database
The 2005 wave of the World Values Survey (WVS) provides a voluminous micro database for many
countries on issues such as people’s values, beliefs, representations, work motivations, and social capital.12
Only this wave contains the relevant variables for the empirical investigation conducted in this paper.
The disobedience variable is the answer to the following question: “would you please indicate whether
the person for whom it is important to always behave properly and to avoid doing anything people would
say is wrong is very much like you, like you, somewhat like you, a little like you, not like you, or not at all
like you?”
A social norm concerning the same matter in two different societies may induce, prescribe, or proscribe
opposite behaviors. The disobedience variable takes into account such differences. Moreover, this variable
encompasses what different societies consider as disobedience.
The Social interactions variable is the “mean” membership level to the following five categories of social
activities: membership of church; membership of sport or recreation; membership of art, music, educational;
membership of labour unions; and membership of professional organization. For each activity, the interviewee
says whether he is not a member (in which case the value of the variable is zero), an inactive member (the
value of the variable is one), or an active member (the value of the variable is two). These variables have
been summed and divided by five to get the mean membership level. Social interactions is therefore on a
scale of eleven: 0, 0.2, 0.4, . . . , 1.8, 2.
The wage rate is proxied by the income variable that is on a scale of ten with one being the lowest
and ten being the highest income decile specific to the country. Income encompasses all wages, salaries,
pensions, and other incomes that come in.
The market wage rate is proxied by the profession of individuals, and it is on a scale of eleven with the
following order: agricultural worker; farmer with own farm; unskilled worker; semi skilled worker; skilled
worker; foreman and supervisor; non-manual - office worker (non-supervisory); office worker (supervises
others); professional worker such as lawyer, accountant, or teacher; employer/manager of establishment
with less than ten employees; employer/manager of establishment with more than ten employees. As the
profession requires more skills and responsibilities, the market wage rate is expected to increase.
The control variables are age (restricted to individuals between twenty and seventy-five13); whether the
person is unemployed; sex; the highest educational level attained; the number of child; the marital status;
12Data source: World Values Survey 2005 Official Data File v.20090901, 2009. World Values Survey Association
(www.worldvaluessurvey.org)
13Such a restriction is made because it is considered that an important fraction of teenagers go to school and have different
social norms than adults on the one hand, and that some time is required for the efficiency effect to become noticeable on the
other hand.
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the size of town; and the religiosity degree. Table E.3 in the Appendix E gives the descriptive statistics of
all the variables. The empirical analysis includes forty-eight countries that were classified by whether they
are rich, emerging, developing (according to Word Economic Outlook Update, July 16, 2012), or if they
have experienced the Arab Spring (see Table E.4 in the Appendix E).
3.2. Empirical Specifications
In order to estimate the gain and the cost of disobedience, the empirical test is performed on the effective
wage rate and the effective level of social interactions. Since the proxies for these variables are both ordered
outcomes, I use an ordered logit procedure: the income decile to which individual k belongs, which is
observed, is assumed to be determined by his effective wage rate. Similarly, the mean membership level to
various activities of individual k is assumed to be determined by his effective level of social interactions. As
the effective wage rate (the effective level of social interactions) crosses higher thresholds, the income decile
(the mean membership level to various activities) to which individual k belongs increases.
Recall that the wage rate is given by w(x,E, δ) = W + γ(x,E, δ). Replacing x by x∗ gives the effective
wage rate denoted w∗∗:
w∗∗
(
W,x∗
)
= W + γ(x∗) (23)
In equation (23), the optimal disobedience level accounts for variations in the economic and social environ-
ment. Thus, the empirical specification of w∗∗ is given by
w∗∗k = η0 + η1Wk +
6∑
j=2
ηjDj,k + η6Hk + k (24)
where Dj is a dummy that takes the value 1 if individual k’s disobedience level is j (D1 has been dropped to
avoid perfect multicollinearity); η0, η1, and ηj are coefficients to be estimated; η6 is a vector of coefficients
to be estimated; H is a vector of control variables and  ∼ Logistic(0, pi2/3) is the error term.
Let Z∗∗s denote the effective level of social interactions which is given by
Z∗∗s =
θT
a
(
w∗∗(W,x∗)
ps
)α
µ(x∗) (25)
As previously, in equation (25), the level of x∗ accounts for variations in the economic and social environment.
The data do not contain information about the prices of market goods entering the production of social
interactions. Therefore, it has to be assumed that all individuals from different countries face the same
prices. Hence, let the empirical specification of the effective level of social interactions be:
Z∗∗s, k = φ0 + φ1wk +
6∑
j=2
φjDj,k + φ7Mk + uk (26)
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where φ0, φ1, and φj are coefficients to be estimated; φ7 is a vector of coefficients to be estimated; M is a
vector of control variables and u ∼ Logistic(0, pi2/3) is the error term.
4. Results
Table 1 shows that each additional level of disobedience is positively related to a higher income up
to disobedience levels 5, 4, and 3 in rich, emerging, and developing countries, respectively (since Arab
Spring countries went through exceptional events, their results are discussed at the end of this section).
As the disobedience level increases further, its coefficients decreases. For example, in emerging countries,
disobedience level 6 has a negative and significant coefficient.
High levels of disobedience having statistically insignificant coefficients indicate that these levels are
not significantly associated with a different income level than the highest level of obedience. Therefore,
disobedience initially increases income and, as disobedience increases further, the income level decreases to
its initial level. These results confirm that above a level of disobedience the punishment effect outweighs
the efficiency effect.
Table 1: Income
Variables Dependent variable: income
sample restricted by country category: Rich Emerging Developing Arab Spring
• disobedience level:
1. Reference level
2. 0.012 0.148** 0.133** 0.033
(0.056) (0.059) (0.055) (0.118)
3. 0.070 0.294*** 0.244*** -0.234
(0.060) (0.063) (0.066) (0.154)
4. 0.157** 0.556*** 0.157* 0.043
(0.069) (0.076) (0.083) (0.192)
5. 0.229*** 0.030 0.153 0.368*
(0.076) (0.084) (0.106) (0.204)
6. 0.035 -0.232* 0.026 0.056
(0.120) (0.133) (0.176) (0.348)
• profession:
agricultural worker Reference level
famer with own farm 0.019 0.241* -0.115 1.038***
(0.377) (0.124) (0.095) (0.267)
unskilled manual worker -0.383 0.222* -0.139* 0.232
(0.353) (0.127) (0.078) (0.205)
semi-skilled manual worker -0.259 0.337*** 0.054 0.982***
(0.349) (0.124) (0.091) (0.221)
skilled manual worker 0.101 0.763*** 0.191*** 1.398***
(0.345) (0.119) (0.072) (0.286)
foreman and supervisor 0.389 1.057*** 0.472** 2.016***
(0.361) (0.179) (0.221) (0.709)
non-manual - office worker: non-supervisory 0.318 0.852*** 0.381*** 1.738***
(0.345) (0.127) (0.103) (0.270)
supervisory - office worker: supervises others 0.673* 0.638*** 1.233*** 1.638***
(0.348) (0.137) (0.132) (0.455)
professional worker (e.g. lawyer, accountant, teacher) 1.123*** 1.126*** 0.849*** 1.596***
(0.350) (0.134) (0.094) (0.279)
13
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.38 (Version révisée)
Table 1: (continued)
employer/manager of establishment (less than 10 employees) 0.692** 0.717*** 1.077*** 2.008***
(0.352) (0.140) (0.138) (0.246)
employer/ manager of establishment (10 or more employees) 1.543*** 1.292*** 1.172*** 2.215***
(0.361) (0.212) (0.280) (0.566)
• highest educational level attained:
no formal education Reference level
incomplete primary school 0.501** 0.496*** 0.420*** -0.445***
(0.232) (0.150) (0.116) (0.159)
complete primary school 0.602*** 1.165*** 0.851*** -0.550**
(0.219) (0.142) (0.104) (0.241)
incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type 0.471** 0.682*** 1.245*** -0.092
(0.225) (0.156) (0.106) (0.343)
complete secondary school: technical/vocational type 0.983*** 1.335*** 1.077*** 0.007
(0.218) (0.145) (0.103) (0.240)
incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type 1.291*** 0.916*** 1.065*** -0.237
(0.229) (0.161) (0.124) (0.217)
complete secondary school: university-preparatory type 1.330*** 1.735*** 0.933*** -0.415**
(0.222) (0.148) (0.118) (0.178)
some university-level education, without degree 1.296*** 1.630*** 1.363*** 0.529
(0.225) (0.165) (0.146) (0.559)
university - level education, with degree 1.678*** 2.074*** 0.952*** 0.429*
(0.223) (0.156) (0.130) (0.239)
• unemployed -1.372*** -0.765*** -0.932*** 1.058
(0.108) (0.111) (0.100) (0.678)
• age 0.090*** 0.002 -0.002 -0.060*
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.031)
age2 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.000 0.001*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
• maried 1.184*** 0.150*** 0.192*** 0.250*
(0.050) (0.056) (0.055) (0.144)
• number of children -0.065*** -0.046*** 0.002 -0.056
(0.018) (0.017) (0.016) (0.037)
• size of town: .
2 000 and less Reference level
2000-5000 0.242*** 0.131* 0.435*** 0.730***
(0.076) (0.079) (0.082) (0.258)
5000-10000 0.319*** 0.145 0.671*** 0.334
(0.080) (0.096) (0.089) (0.247)
10000-20000 0.316*** -0.110 0.652*** 0.464*
(0.075) (0.099) (0.097) (0.246)
20000-50000 0.393*** 0.302*** 0.482*** 0.103
(0.066) (0.101) (0.105) (0.269)
50000-100000 0.307*** 0.103 0.223** 0.559*
(0.084) (0.087) (0.095) (0.296)
100000-500000 0.378*** 0.190*** 0.286*** 0.229
(0.071) (0.067) (0.096) (0.250)
500000 and more 0.347*** 0.348*** 0.565*** -0.434
(0.073) (0.074) (0.090) (0.306)
• sex (female) -0.195*** 0.083** -0.044 0.402***
(0.040) (0.042) (0.045) (0.104)
• religious:
a religious person Reference level
not a religious person -0.037 0.079* 0.344*** -0.599***
(0.042) (0.048) (0.060) (0.199)
a convinced atheist -0.261*** -0.186 0.556***
(0.060) (0.127) (0.090)
Observations 8929 7734 6585 1500
Notes: The coefficients reported in this table are the log odds ratios. Robust standard errors are in brackets. *, **, *** indicate
significance different than zero respectively at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence.
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However, since the different levels of disobedience do not have equal intervals, it cannot be deduced from
Table 1 whether the marginal gain of disobeying inefficient social norms is decreasing between two levels
of disobedience. In Figure 2, the different disobedience levels are arbitrarily considered as equally distant.
Using the results of Table 1, the figure plots the centered probability ratios, that is, the probabilities of
belonging to higher income deciles as disobedience increases from 1 to 2, 1 to 3, 1 to 4, 1 to 5, and 1 to 6
(the reference disobedience level is 1), everything else held constant.14 For example, in emerging countries,
an individual whose disobedience level is 4 is 1.32 times more likely to belong to a higher income decile than
an individual whose disobedience level is 1, everything else equal. Moreover, a second order polynomial
curve is fitted for the different groups of countries by using the nonlinear least square method. The higher is
the curve, the greater is the probability to belong to a higher income decile. Thus, the curve approximates
the expected gain of disobedience (which will be simply referred to as the gain of disobedience).
1.375
0.875
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
1.1
1.15
1.2
1.25
1.3
1.35
x
Rich Countries
Emerging Countries
Developing Countries
Average disobedience level in
rich countries
Average disobedience
level in emerging 
countries
Average disobedience
level in developing
countries
E (γ) 
Figure 2: The expected gain of disobedience derived from Table 1. The interval between the disobedience levels are arbitrarily
considered as equally spaced. The circles, triangles, and squares represents the probability of belonging to a higher income
decile for each disobedience level over the probability of that of disobedience level 1. Note that the significancy of these points
are as in Table 1. A second order polynomial curve is fitted for the different groups of countries by using the nonlinear least
square method.
14The centered probability ratios are obtained by exponentiating the log odds ratios in Table 1, and then by taking their
square roots. The probability ratio (i.e., the risk ratio or the relative risk) has a more intuitive interpretation than the odds
ratio, and interpreting odds ratios as probability ratios inflates effect sizes in probability terms (Liberman, 2005). Liberman
shows that the square root of an odds ratio yields the centered probability ratio (because it centers the probability pair around
0.5), which “provides a sort of average of all possible probability ratios for a given odds ratio”. According to Liberman, the
centered probability ratio is useful for making “general statement across the probability range” and “when one lacks a strong
basis for choosing representative probabilities to explore”.
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Although the marginal gain of disobedience may locally increase between two levels of disobedience in
Figure 2, overall, the marginal gain of disobedience appears to be decreasing: the fitted curve, which has a
strictly decreasing marginal gain, explains 89%, 75%, and 55% of the variance for developing, emerging and
rich countries, respectively. Furthermore, the distance between different disobedience levels can be adjusted
to obtain a strictly decreasing marginal gain. Therefore, the assumption of decreasing marginal gain of
disobedience made in Section 2.1.2 seems plausible.
The Figure 2 shows in addition that the average disobedience levels are below xmax as predicted by
the model. Overall, the gain of disobedience is the highest in emerging countries followed by developing
countries. However, for high levels of disobedience, the gain is the greatest in rich countries.
Table 1 shows furthermore that professions requiring higher qualifications and responsibilities increase
income, suggesting that the market wage rate (W ) is positively related to the effective wage rate (w∗∗).
However, since professions are classified into broad groups, significant differences appear especially between
very distinct groups. For instance, a professional worker (e.g., a lawyer) has a higher income than manual
workers in each group of countries whereas the income difference between a professional worker and an
employer/manager of an establishment with less than 10 employees depends on the country group.
The relation between the level of disobedience and the level of social interactions is given by the Table 2.
In developing countries, each additional level of disobedience (except level 4) deteriorates increasingly social
interactions. In emerging countries disobedience is negatively related to social interactions until disobedience
level 4. Disobedience levels 5 and 6 are associated with more social interactions than levels 3 and 4, but
less than level 1. This result may arise because the proxy for the effective level of social interactions is not
sufficiently precise. Another explanation could be that people belonging to disobedience levels 4 or 5 form
a group within themselves and thus their level of social interactions remains relatively high.
Table 2: Social Interactions
Variables Dependent variable: social interactions
sample restricted
by country category: Rich Emerging Developing Arab Spring
• disobedience level:
1. Reference level
2. 0.165*** -0.267*** -0.351*** 0.241***
(0.048) (0.035) (0.043) (0.071)
3. 0.221*** -0.562*** -0.399*** 0.239***
(0.050) (0.040) (0.053) (0.091)
4. 0.330*** -0.601*** -0.214*** 0.209
(0.054) (0.049) (0.065) (0.140)
5. 0.437*** -0.330*** -0.448*** 0.451***
(0.056) (0.056) (0.081) (0.175)
6. 0.324*** -0.165** -0.531*** -0.201
(0.090) (0.080) (0.152) (0.244)
• incomes decile
1. Reference level
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Table 2: (continued)
2. -0.006 -0.039 -0.130* 0.004
(0.077) (0.058) (0.070) (0.162)
3. 0.066 0.072 -0.084 0.140
(0.074) (0.056) (0.069) (0.153)
4. 0.090 0.168*** 0.143** 0.382***
(0.073) (0.055) (0.071) (0.145)
5. 0.143** 0.295*** 0.096 0.386***
(0.071) (0.052) (0.067) (0.141)
6. 0.345*** 0.276*** 0.323*** 0.851***
(0.074) (0.057) (0.074) (0.151)
7. 0.493*** 0.354*** 0.412*** 0.858***
(0.076) (0.059) (0.081) (0.159)
8. 0.558*** 0.293*** 0.685*** 1.263***
(0.086) (0.067) (0.095) (0.176)
9. 1.041*** 0.030 0.965*** 0.782***
(0.097) (0.094) (0.147) (0.268)
10. 1.083*** 0.245** 1.325*** 0.753*
(0.093) (0.096) (0.212) (0.444)
• highest educational level attained:
no formal education Reference level
incomplete primary school 0.347* 0.075 0.139** 0.854***
(0.186) (0.074) (0.064) (0.143)
complete primary school 0.650*** -0.445*** 0.210*** 1.314***
(0.173) (0.074) (0.060) (0.123)
incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type 1.104*** -0.437*** -0.240*** 2.310***
(0.179) (0.085) (0.071) (0.181)
complete secondary school: technical/vocational type 1.281*** -0.308*** 0.025 1.424***
(0.173) (0.073) (0.065) (0.150)
incomplete secondary school: university-preparatory type 1.316*** 0.344*** -0.288*** 1.403***
(0.183) (0.080) (0.090) (0.151)
complete secondary school: university-preparatory type 1.204*** -0.060 -0.574*** 1.043***
(0.175) (0.074) (0.082) (0.114)
some university-level education, without degree 1.667*** 0.304*** 0.232** 2.703***
(0.177) (0.091) (0.101) (0.196)
university - level education, with degree 1.800*** 0.481*** -0.414*** 2.136***
(0.174) (0.078) (0.092) (0.115)
• unemployed -0.538*** -0.050 -0.345*** 0.275**
(0.069) (0.042) (0.047) (0.117)
• age 0.023*** 0.014** -0.019** 0.038**
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.017)
• age2 -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000 -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
• maried -0.067* -0.268*** -0.492*** -0.155*
(0.039) (0.033) (0.043) (0.083)
• number of children 0.019 0.135*** 0.111*** -0.045*
(0.013) (0.010) (0.011) (0.024)
• sex (female) -0.224*** -0.243*** -0.354*** -0.729***
(0.030) (0.026) (0.035) (0.063)
• religious:
a religious person Reference level
not a religious person -0.703*** -0.463*** -0.809*** -0.028
(0.033) (0.035) (0.057) (0.100)
a convinced atheist -1.018*** -0.623*** -1.282*** 1.118**
(0.049) (0.083) (0.130) (0.484)
Observations 15250 20052 10743 5944
Notes: The coefficients reported in this table are the log odds ratios. Robust standard errors are in brackets. *, **, *** indicate
significance different than zero respectively at 90%, 95% and 99% confidence.
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Concerning rich countries, each additional level of disobedience increases social interactions until level 5,
suggesting that the income effect is greater than the reputation effect. Nevertheless, the highest level of
disobedience is associated with less social interactions than level 5.
Moreover, Table 2 indicates that the level of social interactions decreases with unemployment (as it
is often highlighted in social sciences) and increases with the effective wage rate in rich and developing
countries. These results are similar for emerging countries but the negative coefficient of unemployment is
not statistically significant and the positive relation between the effective wage rate and the level of social
interactions does not hold above income decile 7.
For individuals living in countries that experienced the Arab Spring five years after the WVS 2005
wave, empirical results show that disobedience increases social interactions without affecting the income.
Becker and Murphy (2000, p. 144) argue that inefficient social norms, which impoverish the population
eventually below the subsistence level, may be conveyed by the elite to protect its privileged position. The
model predicts that a decreasing market wage rate (W ) leads to disobedience that in turn slows or offsets
the decrease of the wage rate (w). The empirical results of the Arab Spring countries can therefore be
interpreted as a rejection of social norms (and as an example of the punctuated equilibrium): the people
disobey social norms to maintain their income, and, because the values underlying the struggle are shared
by the society, disobedience leads to a higher level of social interactions rather than social exclusion.
5. Discussion and Concluding Remarks
People “want to be ‘rich and famous’ ” (Akerlof, 1980). The desire to be rich pushes individuals to
disobey social norms whereas the will of being famous, that is, to have plenty of social interactions, may
keep inefficient social norms in place. Increasing disobedience leads the consumer to a point where the
increase of the wage rate (induced by disobedience) does not compensate, in utility terms, the increase of
the social interactions’ shadow price (also induced by disobedience). That point corresponds to the optimal
disobedience level. It is therefore rational that individuals obey inefficient social norms.
The theoretical model predicts that individuals disobey inefficient social norms as (1) their preference
for social interactions decreases; (2) the society gets more tolerant toward individuals who do not comply
to its social norms; (3) the output elasticities of market goods increases; (4) the market wage rate, that is,
the wage rate prevailing in a given profession regardless of the consumer’s behavior vis-a`-vis social norms,
decreases; and (5) the quality of the economic environment, notably the efficiency of formal institutions
(e.g., property rights), improves.
The consequences of disobedience to inefficient norms are (a) a higher income level; (b) more consumption
of the composite commodity; (c) a lower level of social interactions as long as the reputation effect is greater
than the income effect, otherwise the level of social interactions increases; and (d) a substitution of time
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input by market goods.
When individuals have no incentives to disobey inefficient social norms, these will persist longer. As a
consequence, social norms, which form an informal institution, can induce income differences across countries.
Empirical results are consistent with the theory especially for emerging and developing countries, which is
not surprising insofar the weight of informal institutions are likely to be more important in these countries.
As predicted by the model, statistics show that the higher is the average disobedience level in a group of
countries, the richer is this group (see Figure 2). The comparative analysis here below shows the connection
between the theoretical model and the empirical results.
It is widely argued that rich countries have relatively the most efficient formal institutions (E is high).
Moreover, the empirical results have shown that the cost of disobedience in these countries is very low,
suggesting that they are relatively more tolerant toward individuals who disobey their social norms (δ is
low). It is therefore observed that the average disobedience level is the highest in rich countries and, as a
consequence, less inefficient social norms should persist. When social norms are rather efficient, disobedience
should induce only a small increase of the wage rate because the scope of the efficiency gain arising from
disobedience is limited. As expected, the estimated gain of disobedience is low in rich countries
Emerging countries are characterized by recent improvements in their formal institutions. These im-
provements have increased the gain of disobedience that in turn has led to a higher disobedience level.
However, since the disobedience level has increased recently and that it is not as high as that of rich coun-
tries, more inefficient social norms are likely to persist in emerging countries. As a consequence, the gain of
disobedience is higher in emerging countries than in rich countries because the scope of the efficiency gain
is wider.
Moreover, the evolution of inefficient social norms in emerging countries seems to be induced mainly by
improvements in formal institutions rather than greater tolerance because the intolerance of the society to
disobedience is high. Possibly, some groups within the society have less incentives to disobey and therefore
the new norms are not accepted by the whole society yet. Such broad range of social behaviors within a
society reflects a social evolution which is to be linked with social tensions and inequalities; indeed, the
behavioral gap between rich and poor, urban and rural, or educated and non-educated is likely to be rather
wide in emerging countries.
The gain of disobedience is lower in developing countries than in emerging countries because the former
do not have the economic environment which would allow individuals to fully take advantage of their
disobedience to inefficient social norms. Additionally, the level of intolerance to disobedience in developing
countries is similar to that of emerging countries. As a result, the incentives to disobey the society’s social
norms in developing countries are relatively low and thus most people obey them.
The model could be applied to specific norms or to broader issues. For instance, the model suggests that
a higher wage rate, induced by disobeying inefficient social norms, results in social interactions to be market
19
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.38 (Version révisée)
goods intensive. This implies that individuals in rich countries maintain their level of social interactions by
relying more on, say, trendy cloths, gifts, items reflecting membership to various groups, rather than the
time spent for social interactions. As a result, disobedience to social norms affects consumption decisions
by increasing the share of the budget allocated to the market goods mentioned above. Furthermore, I have
briefly discussed in Section 4 how the model’s predictions may offer a complementary explanation about an
individual’s decision to uprise against the existing institutions.
The theory developed in this paper raises new questions. The long term dynamics of the model and
the way the society’s tolerance is determined appear to be particularly important. The specificity of the
long term is that the disobedience level to social norms of an individual can affect the disobedience level of
others.
Appendix A. The variation of Z∗s and Z
∗
c induced by a change in x
Derive equation (17) with respect to (w.r.t. hereafter) x:
∂Z∗s
∂x
=
θT
pαs a
(
α
∂w(x)
∂x
µ(x)
w(x)1−α
+
∂µ(x)
∂x
w(x)α
)
(A.1)
Given that
[
∂f(x)/∂x
]
/f(x) = ∂
[
log f(x)
]
/∂x, ∂Z∗s /∂x > 0 if
α
∂ logw(x)
∂x
> −∂ logµ(x)
∂x
(A.2)
Given the properties of w and µ, deduce that limx→0
[
∂
(
logw
)
/∂x
]
= +∞ and limx→0
[
∂
(
logµ
)
/∂x
]
= 0.
As a result, when x → 0, inequality (A.2) holds. On the other hand, limx→xmax
[
∂
(
logw
)
/∂x
]
= 0 and
limx→xmax
[
∂
(
logµ
)
/∂x
]
= y with y < 0. Thus, when x→ xmax, inequality (A.2) does not hold.
Recall that x ∈ [0, xmax]. In between this range, ∂
(
logw
)
/∂x is decreasing and −∂( logµ)/∂x is in-
creasing with x. Let x′ denote the highest value of x for which inequality (A.2) holds. As long as x < x′,
Z∗s increases with x (income effect), otherwise Z
∗
s decreases with increasing x (reputation effect).
Derive equation (18) w.r.t. x:
∂Z∗c
∂x
=
∂w(x)
∂x
β
w(x)1−β
(1− θ)T
pβc b
(A.3)
The right hand side (RHS hereafter) of equation (A.3) is always positive: Z∗c is strictly increasing with x.
Appendix B. Maximization of V : second order condition
Let
ζ ≡ T
(
θ
a pαs
)θ (
1− θ
b pβc
)1−θ
(B.1)
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and
Ψ ≡ αθ + β(1− θ) (B.2)
Hence, ∂V (x)/∂x (equation [20]) can be written as
∂V (x)
∂x
= ζ w(x)Ψµ(x)θ
∂ logw(x)
∂x
Ψ + ζ w(x)Ψµ(x)θθ
∂ logµ(x)
∂x
(B.3)
∂V (x)/∂x = 0 corresponds to a maximum if ∂2V (x)/∂x2 < 0, which implies
ζΨ
[
Ψ
∂w(x)
∂x
w(x)Ψ−1µ(x)θ
∂ logw(x)
∂x
+ w(x)Ψθ
∂µ(x)
∂x
µ(x)θ−1
∂ logw(x)
∂x
+ w(x)Ψµ(x)θ
∂2 logw(x)
∂x2
]
+ ζθ
[
Ψ
∂w(x)
∂x
w(x)Ψ−1µ(x)θ
∂ logµ(x)
∂x
+ w(x)Ψθ
∂µ(x)
∂x
µ(x)θ−1
∂ logµ(x)
∂x
+ w(x)Ψµ(x)θ
∂2 logµ(x)
∂x2
]
< 0
(B.4)
Divide both side of this inequation by ζ, w(x)Ψ and µ(x)θ, and, after rearranging it, inequation (B.4)
becomes
Ψ2
(
∂ logw(x)
∂x
)2
+θ2
(
∂ logµ(x)
∂x
)2
+2Ψθ
∂ logw(x)
∂x
∂ logµ(x)
∂x
+
(
Ψ
∂2 logw(x)
∂x2
+θ
∂2 logµ(x)
∂x2
)
< 0 (B.5)
Note that 2Ψθ
[
∂ logw(x)/∂x
][
∂ logµ(x)/∂x
]
< 0 and Ψ
[
∂2 logw(x)/∂x2
]
+ θ
[
∂2 logµ(x)/∂x2
]
< 0. More-
over, the first order condition for maximizing V (x) requires that (see equation [20]):
(
α+
β(1− θ)
θ
)
∂ logw(x)
∂x
+
∂ logµ(x)
∂x
= 0 (B.6)
which is equivalent to (
α+
β(1− θ)
θ
)
∂ logw(x)
∂x
= −∂ logµ(x)
∂x
(B.7)
Multiply both side of equation (B.7) by θ and then square it. Using equation (B.2), equation (B.7) becomes
Ψ2
(
∂ logw(x)
∂x
)2
= θ2
(
∂ logµ(x)
∂x
)2
(B.8)
Therefore, inequation (B.5) is true and ∂2V (x)/∂x2 < 0 for x∗.
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Appendix C. Uniqueness of the optimal disobedience level
∂V (x)/∂x = 0 if (see equation[20])
∂w(x)
∂x
[
αθ + β(1− θ)] w(x)−1 + θ∂µ(x)
∂x
µ(x)−1 = 0 (C.1)
Recall equation (5): w(x,E, δ) = W + γ(x,E, δ), hence
(
∂w/∂x
)
=
(
∂γ/∂x
)
. Thus, dividing both sides of
equation (C.1) by θ and rearranging it yields
− ∂γ(x,E, δ)/∂x
∂µ(x, δ)/∂x
=
W + γ(x,E, δ)
µ(x, δ)
(
α+ β(1− θ)/θ) (C.2)
Equation (C.1) can be also written as
∂ logw(x,E, δ)
∂x
(
α+
β(1− θ)
θ
)
= −∂ logµ(x, δ)
∂x
(C.3)
When x→ 0, the left hand side (LHS hereafter) is greater than the RHS. Moreover, ∂( logw)/∂x is strictly
decreasing and −∂( logµ)/∂x is strictly increasing. Thus, there is a unique value of x as a function of the
exogenous variables, denoted x∗, that verifies (C.3): x∗ = x(θ, α, β, δ, E,W )
Appendix D. Comparative statics: optimal level of disobedience
Let the function F be given by
F (x,E, δ, α, β, θ,W ) =
(
α+
β(1− θ)
θ
)
∂ logw(x,E, δ,W )
∂x
+
∂ logµ(x, δ)
∂x
= 0 (D.1)
The total derivative of F is
dF (x,E, δ, α, β, θ,W ) =
∂F
∂x
dx+
∂F
∂E
dE +
∂F
∂δ
dδ +
∂F
∂α
dα+
∂F
∂β
dβ +
∂F
∂θ
dθ +
∂F
∂W
dW = 0 (D.2)
• Suppose dδ = dα = dβ = dθ = dW = 0. The total derivative of F becomes
dF (x,E, δ) =
[(
α+
β(1− θ)
θ
)
∂2 logw(x,E, δ,W )
∂x2
+
∂2 logµ(x, δ)
∂x2
]
dx
+
[(
α+
β(1− θ)
θ
)
∂2 logw(x,E, δ,W )
∂x∂E
]
dE = 0 (D.3)
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Given the properties of w and µ, deduce that ∂F/∂x < 0 and ∂F/∂E > 0, hence
− ∂F/∂E
∂F/∂x
=
dx
dE
> 0 (D.4)
Therefore when E increases, x∗ must increase.
• Suppose that dE = dα = dβ = dθ = dW = 0. Repeat the same steps, and given the properties of w and
µ deduce that
∂F
∂δ
=
(
α+
β(1− θ)
θ
)
∂2 logw(x,E, δ,W )
∂x∂δ
+
∂2 logµ(x, δ)
∂x∂δ
< 0 (D.5)
Thus,
− ∂F/∂δ
∂F/∂x
=
dx
dδ
< 0 (D.6)
Equation (D.6) indicates that when δ increases, x∗ will decrease.
• dE = dδ = dβ = dθ = dW = 0. Deduce that
∂F
∂α
=
∂ logw(x,E, δ,W )
∂x
> 0 (D.7)
Therefore,
− ∂F/∂δ
∂F/∂x
=
dx
dα
> 0 (D.8)
Equation (D.8) indicates that when α increases, x∗ will increase.
• dE = dδ = dα = dθ = dW = 0. Deduce that
∂F
∂β
=
(
1− θ
θ
)
∂ logw(x,E, δ,W )
∂x
> 0 (D.9)
Hence,
− ∂F/∂β
∂F/∂x
=
dx
dβ
> 0 (D.10)
Therefore when β increases, x∗ must increase.
• dE = dδ = dα = dβ = dW = 0. Deduce that
∂F
∂θ
= −β
(
∂ logw(x,E, δ,W )
∂x
)
θ−2 < 0 (D.11)
Thus,
− ∂F/∂θ
∂F/∂x
=
dx
dθ
< 0 (D.12)
Equation (D.12) indicates that when θ increases, x∗ will decrease.
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• dE = dδ = dα = dβ = dθ = 0. Deduce that
∂F
∂W
= −
(
α+
β(1− θ)
θ
)
∂γ/∂x(
W + γ(x,E, δ)
)2 < 0 (D.13)
Hence,
− ∂F/∂W
∂F/∂x
=
dx
dW
< 0 (D.14)
When W increases, x∗ will decrease.
24
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.38 (Version révisée)
Appendix E. Descriptive Statistics
Table E.3: Descriptive Statistics
Variables Observations Mean Min. Max. Standard Deviation
Rich Countries
disobedience 18760 2.948881 1 6 1.39283
social interactions 18563 .3949146 0 2 .404127
profession 12905 5.765982 0 10 2.302006
income 17451 5.03931 1 10 2.384081
education 18844 6.109212 1 9 2.263786
age 18978 45.7173 20 75 14.98525
married 17725 .7127221 0 1 .4525051
number of children 18880 1.646981 0 8 1.383583
size of town 12564 4.888093 1 8 2.373449
female 18971 1.527437 1 2 .4992598
not religious 18306 1.625205 1 3 .687959
Emerging Countries
disobedience 23490 2.611622 1 6 1.333263
social interactions 24064 .3320977 0 2 .4382459
profession 15504 4.283862 0 10 2.863735
income 22840 4.584851 1 10 2.339835
education 24298 5.279241 1 9 2.460791
age 24446 41.74675 20 75 14.41014
married 23661 .7124805 0 1 .4526154
number of children 24244 1.932684 0 8 1.696938
size of town 14447 4.537828 1 8 2.670091
female 24442 1.519147 1 2 .4996435
not religious 23328 1.293467 1 3 .5223567
Developing Countries
disobedience 13071 2.270063 1 6 1.289552
social interactions 12360 .4230744 0 2 .4585426
profession 7716 3.698937 0 10 2.984766
income 12437 4.534534 1 10 2.129916
education 13225 4.308658 1 9 2.379715
age 13358 38.32071 20 75 14.23918
married 12970 .6454896 0 1 .4783831
number of children 13339 2.193118 0 8 2.087861
size of town 12208 4.811599 1 8 2.43807
female 13347 1.50206 1 2 .5000145
not religious 12981 1.203605 1 3 .4776089
Countries that Experienced the Arab Spring
disobedience 6464 1.978342 1 6 1.170249
social interactions 6426 .1566138 0 2 .2993076
profession 2053 4.174866 0 10 2.892504
income 6479 4.341256 1 10 1.937846
education 6498 4.523546 1 9 2.94647
age 6508 37.76368 20 75 13.31946
married 6414 .7117244 0 1 .4529954
number of children 6294 2.358278 0 8 2.051192
size of town 5261 4.801749 1 8 2.457557
female 6489 1.556018 1 2 .4968904
not religious 6386 1.104291 1 3 .3071945
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Table E.4: List of Countries and Number of Observations
Number Country Category Observations Table 1 Observations Table 2
1 Andorra Rich 844 876
2 Australia Rich 1 003 1 002
3 Brazil Emerging 1 017 1 251
4 Britain Rich 611 628
5 Bulgaria Emerging 316 705
6 Burkina Faso Developing 395 859
7 Canada Rich 806 1412
8 Chile Emerging 661 808
9 China Emerging . 1424
10 Cyprus Rich . 919
11 Egypt Arab Spring 715 2967
12 Ethiopia Developing 577 1 114
13 France Rich 683 714
14 Finland Rich . 703
15 Georgia Developing 1 008 1 256
16 Germany Rich 1 295 1 422
17 Ghana Developing 781 1 134
18 India Emerging 910 1 470
19 Indonesia Emerging 949 1 423
20 Iran Arab Spring . 2 127
21 Japan Rich . 721
22 Malaysia Emerging 708 962
23 Mali Developing 42 649
24 Mexico Emerging . 1219
25 Moldova Developing 776 867
26 Morocco Arab Spring 785 850
27 Netherlands Rich . 552
28 Norway Rich 777 823
29 Peru Emerging . 1 154
30 Poland Emerging 348 765
31 Romania Emerging 537 1 259
32 Russia Emerging . 1 202
33 Rwanda Developing 764 1 114
34 Serbia Emerging 479 878
35 Slovenia Rich 612 765
36 South Africa Emerging . 2298
37 South Korea Rich . 1 164
38 Spain Rich . 911
39 Sweden Rich 744 768
40 Switzerland Rich . 784
41 Taiwan Rich . 1 086
42 Thailand Emerging 1 001 1 374
43 Trinidad and Tobago Developing 447 851
44 Turkey Emerging . 1 148
45 Ukraine Emerging . 712
46 Uruguay Developing 333 776
47 Vietnam Developing 1125 1 305
48 Zambia Developing 337 818
Note: Morocco and Iran are included into the Arab Spring countries group: the former country witnessed uprisings
and constitutional reforms in the context of the Arab Spring. Iran, although not an Arab country in its majority,
is also included in this category because the protests that stroked the country may have been influenced by the
Arab Spring.
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